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Survey of central banks’ views 




This paper addresses two main issues. First, how do central banks in the emerging market economies 
assess the effects of their foreign exchange interventions on the exchange rate? Second, how do they 
view other external effects of intervention, such as the relationship between intervention, reserve 
accumulation and external vulnerabilities, and the usefulness of additional rules on foreign exchange 
transactions? The analysis in the paper is based on central bank responses to a BIS questionnaire 
prepared for this meeting, interviews with central bank staff, and studies of intervention prepared by 
central banks from emerging market economies. 
To date, there have been only a few empirical studies of foreign exchange intervention covering a 
broad cross section of emerging market economies. The most extensive study is Canales-Kriljenko 
(2003), based on the IMF’s 2001 Survey on Foreign Exchange Market Organisation. One of the main 
hypotheses advanced in this paper is that central banks in many emerging markets may be able to 
conduct foreign exchange intervention more effectively than the central banks of countries issuing the 
major international currencies. This hypothesis is supported by evidence indicating the large size of 
intervention by emerging economy central banks relative to their foreign exchange market turnover. 
Moreover, evidence is presented that central banks in emerging markets issue a large volume of 
regulations and conduct their foreign exchange operations in a way that increases the central bank's 
information advantage over private sector participants. However, the study does not demonstrate 
decisively that official intervention in the emerging market economies is indeed more effective because 
of these characteristics of their foreign exchange markets. 
Another useful empirical study is by Neely (2001), who examined the practice of foreign exchange 
intervention in a sample of 22 countries, of which nine are emerging market economies.
2 This study 
addressed directly to central banks several questions on the effectiveness of foreign exchange 
intervention. It will therefore be used to compare some responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
Central banks from the emerging market economies have conducted a number of own studies on the 
effectiveness of intervention. The recently published studies, many of which are surveyed in the 
accompanying review of the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention, include Tapia and Tokman 
(2004) for Chile; Holub (2004) for the Czech Republic; Pattanaik and Sahoo (2003) for India; Ryoo 
(2003) for Korea; Flores Bahamonde (2003) and Azañero Saona (2003) for Peru; Abenoja (2003) and 
Boge et al (2001) for the Philippines; Guimarães and Karacadağ (2004) for Mexico and Turkey; and 
Domaç and Mendoza (2004) for Turkey. In addition, the central banks of China, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and Turkey have conducted internal studies on the effectiveness of official 
intervention.
3 
The rest of this paper is divided into two parts. Section 2 analyses central banks’ own views on the 
effectiveness of intervention, looking at the frequency and size of interventions, effectiveness by goals 
and channels of influence, central banks’ information advantage in foreign exchange markets, and 
secret interventions. Section 3 considers other external effects of intervention: the relationship 
between reserve accumulation, credit ratings and external vulnerabilities; the use of capital controls 
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2  These are: Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, Korea and Taiwan (China). 
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and rules on foreign exchange transactions in conjunction with official intervention; and the impact of 
financial dollarisation on the effectiveness of intervention. 
1.  Central banks’ views on effectiveness of intervention 
Frequency and size of interventions 
Of the 19 central banks that responded to the BIS questionnaire, about one third have intervened 
regularly (ie on more than 50% of business days), one third relatively infrequently (every 10 days or 
less), and one third have not conducted any interventions at all over the past three years (Table 1). At 
first sight, this pattern of responses would seem to imply a bias against interventions in the emerging 
market economies, contrary to the claims in much of the literature. However, four central banks 
reported that they intervened on every business day; in addition, all of the three central banks that did 
not respond to this question are known to intervene, two of them frequently. Data in Table 1 also 
indicate that the frequency of interventions has declined marginally since 2002. 
 
Table 1 
Frequency of interventions 
Number of central banks which conducted foreign exchange 
intervention  Percentage of business days on 
which central banks conducted 
foreign exchange intervention 
2002 2003 2004 
Regularly (>50% of business days)  5  6  6 
11-50% of business days  4  3  2 
0-10% of business days  5  5  5 
Never  5 5 6 
No  response  4 4 4 
Total number of observations  23  23  23 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
All of the central banks in the sample that do not intervene have adopted inflation targeting 
frameworks and floating exchange rate regimes. It is interesting that one central bank that operates a 
fixed exchange rate regime intervenes seldom, relying most of the time on interest rates and other 
instruments affecting interbank liquidity, while one that operates what is nominally a floating exchange 
rate regime intervenes regularly. Countries in the sample where central banks do not intervene (as 
well as those that seldom intervene) are generally small open economies, while those that intervene 
regularly are much larger and, with one exception, are equally open.
4 
Data in Table 2 indicate that, in the sample of economies studied in this paper, central bank 
interventions are small relative to the size of their foreign exchange markets. The average size of 
interventions declined from 12% of average daily turnover in 2002 to 5% in 2004, or about 
USD  50  million in absolute terms. The most frequent daily intervention volume (the mode) has 
declined by almost 50% over the past three years, and at USD 29 million in 2004 was fairly small. The 
largest daily intervention volume in the sample amounted to USD 5 billion or 780% of the average 
daily turnover in that country’s foreign exchange market, boosting official reserves by 38%. The 
smallest interventions amounted to just USD  0.5  million. In sum, relative to the size of foreign 
reserves, the size of interventions (with the exception of the largest one) has been negligible. 
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Against this background, it is interesting to note the evidence from Canales-Kriljenko (2003), who used 
a sample of 17 out of 90 central banks surveyed to argue that central banks had a dominant position 
in developing countries’ foreign exchange markets. Moreover, he obtained high market shares for 
central bank intervention measured only against trading in the interbank market. In many developing 
countries, interbank trading accounts for just a fraction of turnover in the bank-customer segment of 
the market.
5 At the level of bank-customer trading, Canales-Kriljenko (2003) finds lower shares of 
central bank intervention in total trading volumes, although these shares are still high compared to the 
ones reported in Table 2. This suggests perhaps that the countries reporting these data to Canales-
Kriljenko were less developed than the ones studied in this paper. 
 
Table 2 
Size of interventions 
In millions of USD 
As a percentage 
of average daily 
FX market turnover 
As a percentage of 
average monthly 
FX reserves  Size of foreign 
exchange interventions 
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Average  42 54  50  12 8 5  0.45  0.28  0.14 
Mode 52  41  29  3.6  7.1  0.7  0.14 0.22 0.06 
Maximum 450  4,936  465  71  780  52  1.7  38.3  3.7 
Minimum 1.0  0.5  0.5  0.12 0.02 0.03  0.010 0.010 0.004 
Number of observations: 13 out of 23. Three central banks in the sample did not intervene during 2002-2004 Q3. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
 
It is also instructive to juxtapose the size of interventions to the development of foreign exchange 
markets. Data from the latest BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives 
Market Activity (BIS (2005)) indicate that average daily turnover of most emerging market currencies 
has increased strongly since 1998 (Table A1 in Appendix). The share traded in the derivatives market 
(forwards and swaps) relative to the spot market has also increased in many countries, as has the 
share of trading activity undertaken outside the home market. Yet compared to currencies of smaller 
industrial countries, the turnover in emerging market currencies remains miniscule. Table A1 shows, 
for instance, that the average daily turnover of most actively traded emerging market currencies – the 
Hong Kong dollar, the Korean won and the Mexican peso - represents only a fraction of the turnover in 
the Australian dollar, the Swedish krona or the Swiss franc markets. The small size of interventions 
relative to average daily turnover noted above is therefore not a result of increased turnover in foreign 
exchange markets but of small size of interventions.  
The second point to note in this context is that central banks in emerging markets have indeed an 
overwhelming potential “firepower”. The ratio of official reserves to average daily turnover is vastly 
higher in emerging markets than in industrial countries - on average, official reserves were 15 times 
the size of daily turnover in emerging market currencies, compared with less than half in smaller 
industrial countries. It is therefore not surprising that the threat of intervention - and hence its potential 
effectiveness - is much greater in emerging markets than industrial countries. 
The sample size is clearly far too small to draw firm conclusions about the relationship between the 
size of intervention and different monetary and exchange rate regimes. Only two economies operating 
under a fixed exchange rate regime reported data for Table 2. One of them did report higher mean 
and mode sizes of intervention than central banks operating under managed or floating regimes. 
Interventions by managed floaters were also larger on average than those by free floaters. 
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What is the evidence on the impact of size and frequency of interventions on their effectiveness? As 
discussed in Archer’s paper in this volume on the techniques and tactics of intervention, Japan, for 
instance, has in recent years shifted from regular and small foreign exchange interventions to large 
and less frequent interventions. Some argue that this has made Japanese interventions more effective 
than before - but at the price of a truly massive scale (7% of GDP in FY 2003). 
From the small sample at hand, it is difficult to draw conclusions about this issue for the emerging 
market economies. Out of 18 central banks, 14 characterised their interventions as effective most of 
the time (Table 3). Eight of these 14 central banks also reported the size and frequency of their 
interventions. Most of these central banks intervened less frequently on average (ie on less than 10% 
of business days, with three exceptions), and in relatively small amounts (3% of market turnover on 
average). 
Five central banks that viewed their interventions as “sometimes effective” intervened in large amounts 
(6-22% of average daily turnover) on a small number of occasions, though one of them was present in 
the market on 30% of business days in one particular year. The sixth central bank that viewed its 
intervention as sometimes effective intervened every business day in small amounts (of about 0.6% of 
average daily turnover). The seventh last intervened in 2002, in small amounts, on about 10% of 
business days. 
In sum, survey results seem to indicate that the emerging market central banks that intervene less 
frequently in smaller amounts tend to view their interventions as more effective on average than those 
that intervene less frequently in large amounts. The interpretation of this finding is not straightforward 
because of the simultaneity problem - those central banks with large interventions may have faced the 
greatest pressure. Finally, one should note that many central banks that operate under a floating 
exchange rate regime intervene only to address exceptional circumstances, rather than to affect the 
exchange rate per se. The size and frequency of their interventions are therefore determined on a 
case by case basis. 
 
Table 3 
Effectiveness of interventions by major goals 
 
Correct misalignment or stabilise 
exchange rate at desired level or 
rate of change 
Calm disorderly markets  
(excessive exchange 
rate volatility) 
Effective most of the time  Argentina, Chile, Hong Kong SAR, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Peru, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Turkey 
Sometimes effective  Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Korea, Venezuela  
Brazil, Czech Republic, Mexico, 
Venezuela  
Never (or rarely) effective     
Number of observations: 18 out of 23. Three central banks in the sample did not intervene during 2002-2004 Q3. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
 
Assessments of effectiveness by goals of intervention 
Regarding the effectiveness of interventions in meeting different objectives, 12 out of 16 central banks 
that intervened to calm disorderly markets viewed their intervention as mostly effective, while four 
viewed it as sometimes effective (Table 3, last column). In contrast, only half of the central banks that 
intervened to correct misalignment or to stabilise the exchange rate at a desired level (or rate of 
change) indicated that this type of intervention was effective most of the time. Among those that 
viewed this type of intervention as effective, two out of six (Hong Kong SAR and Malaysia) operate - 
not surprisingly - a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Regarding intervention to calm disorderly markets, several central banks felt that their intervention was 
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excessive exchange rate volatility due to shallow foreign exchange markets. One central bank 
managed on one occasion to calm the market with a sale of as little as USD 9 million (compared to its 
reserves of USD 33 billion) at a time when concerns about liquidity were beginning to emerge.
6  
Views differed on whether intervention to calm disorderly markets is more effective in influencing the 
exchange rate at shorter time horizons than at longer horizons. Several studies in the context of 
industrial countries have found evidence that foreign exchange intervention might be more effective in 
influencing the exchange rate at shorter time horizons (eg over two to three days or over one week) 
than at longer horizons (eg moving the path of the exchange rate over three months or longer).
7 Neely 
(2001) found, in a sample of 13 industrial countries and nine emerging economies, that in 39% of 
cases it took just a few minutes to observe the effect of intervention on exchange rates; in 22% of 
cases it took a few hours; and in 49% a few days or more. 
The majority of central banks in this survey confirmed that the short-term effects of intervention were 
larger, partly because continuous intervention to attain long-term effects was costly. However, one 
central bank noted that repeated intervention was necessary at times of heightened volatility because 
the effects of an initial intervention were not lasting. 
Several central banks commented that the main burden in stabilising the exchange rate was always on 
monetary policy - and often on fiscal policy as well. For instance, if the exchange rate was depreciating 
because of weak fundamentals, intervention would not help stabilise it for very long unless the central 
bank raised interest rates. Likewise, trying to reverse depreciation by intervening in the forex market 
was ineffective in the face of large budget deficits. 
Due to relatively favourable conditions in global capital markets over the past three years, most central 
banks in the sample intervened to correct misalignment or stabilise the exchange rate during periods 
of appreciating exchange rates. Currency appreciation was easier to resist than depreciation, but even 
here market scepticism could be an obstacle. For instance, if a central bank had already accumulated 
large official reserves, markets knew in some cases that the central bank would be reluctant to acquire 
additional reserves because of the negative impact of sterilisation on its balance sheet. Although they 
did not feel constrained by the size of their foreign currency reserves, most central banks judged this 
type of intervention as only partly successful in stemming appreciation. 
Three central banks (of which one adopted a fixed exchange rate regime) found no difference in 
intervention effectiveness between periods of appreciation and depreciation. 
Assessments by channels of influence of intervention 
The recent academic literature surveyed in the accompanying paper by Disyatat and Galati in this 
volume suggests that interventions in industrial countries are more likely to influence the exchange 
rate through the expectations channel than through the portfolio balance channel. For the expectations 
channel to work, however, interventions would need to signal future monetary policy. On the other 
hand, in the emerging market economies the portfolio balance channel should also be effective, given 
that the official reserves, as noted above, are much larger relative to the local foreign exchange 
market, and debt instruments denominated in domestic and foreign currencies are less substitutable 
than in industrial countries. 
The survey results provide qualified support for this view. Most notable is the consensus view that 
interventions which create expectations about future intervention are effective (Table 4, penultimate 
column). Consistent with the recent literature, seven central banks consider as partly or mostly 
effective those interventions that change private agents’ exchange rate expectations by giving signals 
about the future stance of monetary policy. But 10 central banks also view the portfolio balance 
channel as partly or mostly effective.
8 In addition, some central banks reported other channels of 
                                                       
6  Experience from some industrial countries indicates that, when markets are under pressure and bid-offer spreads start to 
widen, the mere offer by the central bank to sell foreign exchange at the prevailing bid rate might be sufficient to calm the 
market, without any transactions actually taking place at that rate. 
7  See, for instance, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Truman (2002, 2003). 
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influence as being of relevance; for instance, the microstructure channel (which was probably effective 
in the Czech Republic during July-September 2002; see Holub (2004)); the liquidity effect in the 
foreign exchange market; and signalling the central bank’s view about the rate of change of the 
exchange rate. Some central banks felt that intervention operated through all the channels identified in 
Table 4 because they intervened for different reasons at different times. 
Central banks put forward some interesting arguments supporting these assessments. On the portfolio 
balance channel, one central bank noted that it was able to influence the exchange rate to a certain 
extent because it was a major player in both foreign exchange and securities markets. Two other 
central banks considered this type of intervention as effective only on those specific occasions when 
movements in foreign and domestic currency assets were anticipated, and were considered to be of a 
one-off nature (eg asset reallocations associated with large privatisation inflows). However, when such 
inflows were expected to continue, central bank intervention tended to have only a short-lived effect on 
asset allocations and hence the exchange rate. 
Some central banks have found the expectations about future intervention an effective way to 
influence market behaviour. One central bank considered this channel to be the most effective means 
to dissipate appreciation or depreciation pressures in the short run. Two others noted that, once they 
started to intervene, market participants in general expected interventions to continue, and tried to 
establish a pattern for interventions. Still another central bank argued that intervention provided an 
indication of the views of the monetary authorities as to whether the exchange rate was in line with 
fundamentals. Since this central bank was considered to be a credible institution, an intervention was 
generally seen as a signal of continued intervention in the future to prevent the exchange rate from 
deviating too much from macroeconomic fundamentals. This, in turn, influenced the exchange rate in 
the desired direction. 
 
Table 4 
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Philippines Singapore       
Number of observations: 15 out of 23. Three central banks in the sample did not intervene during 2002-2004 Q3. 
1  Effect on domestic interest rates, when intervention is not fully sterilised.   
2  Composition of domestic and foreign assets 
held by the main market participants changes as a result of sterilised intervention.   
3  Sterilised intervention changes private 
agents’ exchange rate expectations by giving signals about the future stance of monetary policy.     
4  For  example, 
microstructure channel - impact of intervention on buy or sell orders of traders who follow past market trends. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
 
Interventions that influence the exchange rate by affecting expectations about the future stance of 
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market rates. Several central banks observed that the narrowing and widening of these differentials 
has led to shifts in expectations about future movements in relative money supplies, which could steer 
the exchange rate in the desired direction. One central bank observed, however, that interventions 
affected the relevant domestic interest rate with a lag. 
According to one central bank, intervention affected the exchange rate through the expectations 
channel because of the role the exchange rate plays in the dynamics of domestic inflation. When the 
pass-through from exchange rate changes to inflation was high, changes in exchange rates were 
transmitted through the economy faster than changes in interest rates, so there was room for 
intervention to support monetary policy. However, this effect seemed to work only if central banks 
openly said that they intervened to support the disinflation process; otherwise they could confuse the 
market. 
Central banks’ information advantage 
One condition for the expectations channel to function is that the central bank taking action either has 
or is believed to have an information advantage over market participants. Sterilised interventions can 
then affect market expectations of the exchange rate by “signalling” future monetary policy. A central 
bank can, for instance, signal a more restrictive future monetary policy by purchasing domestic 
currency. 
Against this background, central banks were asked to what extent they had an information advantage 
relative to the large number of uncoordinated, competing individual participants in the more “atomistic” 
structure of the foreign exchange market. They were also asked what impact this advantage had on 
the effectiveness of their intervention. Most central banks (15 out of 21) responded that they had 
“considerable” or “some” information advantage; three felt they worked with basically the same 
information set as market participants, while three thought they were at a disadvantage compared with 
market participants (Table 5). One central bank remarked that any information advantage it might have 
had in the past had disappeared with the spread of the internet. 
 
Table 5 
Central bank’s information advantage and its impact 












to other market 
participants 
Brazil, Hungary, Korea, 
Malaysia, Peru, 




Singapore, Thailand  
Chile, Czech Republic, 
Hong Kong SAR 
Indonesia, New Zealand, 
Poland 
Impact of information advantage on effectiveness of intervention
2 
Major positive impact  Some positive impact  No impact on effectiveness 
of intervention 
Brazil, Korea, Philippines, 
Singapore, Turkey 
Argentina, Hungary, India, Peru, 
South Africa, Thailand  
Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico 
1  A total of 21 central banks (out of 23) responded.   
2  A total of 15 central banks (out of 23) responded (three central banks 
do not intervene). 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
 
Examples of the information advantage that central banks enjoy relative to other market participants 
include: receiving on a daily basis positions and transactions similar to the BIS triennial foreign 
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data on foreign exchange swap positions and turnover (albeit with a lag in some cases), and on 
forward transactions (including non-deliverable forwards); detailed statistical data on transactions of all 
banks, brokerage companies and other participants in foreign exchange markets; and information on 
the movement of government funds and large inflows and outflows of funds in the system due to debt 
servicing, foreign portfolio investment and trade flows. In addition, in their role as regulators of 
commercial banks, central banks in many countries can request information regarding flows they see 
in the foreign exchange market. Most central banks also felt they had very good market intelligence 
networks and received ongoing feedback from market participants. As one central banker put it: “We 
can observe every aspect of market participants’ behaviour - except their intentions.” 
With one exception (Hong Kong SAR), central banks that felt they had an information disadvantage 
relative to other market participants were those that did not intervene. One of them noted that it had no 
access to the trading quotations (either transaction prices or volumes) and no precise information 
about corporate flows and portfolio flows in general, given that it was not an active market participant. 
The extent of information advantage generally corresponds to central banks’ assessments of the 
impact this advantage has on the effectiveness of intervention. For instance, central banks that have 
considerable or some information advantage also find that this advantage has a major or some 
positive impact on the effectiveness of their intervention. But in Colombia, Malaysia and Mexico, this 
advantage apparently had no impact on the effectiveness of intervention. In the case of Colombia, the 
reason was that the option holders decided when to exercise the options the central bank used for 
intervention purposes. 
Secret interventions 
A major puzzle in the literature on the effectiveness of intervention is why most actual intervention 
operations in the foreign exchange market have been - and still are - largely secret. That is, they are 
not publicly announced by monetary authorities, despite the relatively robust finding that policy 
announcements affect expectations through the signalling channel. Central banks were asked which 
of the four types of arguments in favour of the secrecy that have been identified in the literature most 
closely corresponded to their practice.
9 
There is a significant range of views in the survey about the purpose of secrecy (Table 6). Ten central 
banks conducted secret interventions. Six of them reported that secret interventions helped them 
maximise market impact and were always or sometimes effective, ie helped them calm a highly 
volatile market. Two central banks considered that interventions conducted to minimise market impact 
were always effective. One cited portfolio adjustment as a reason for secret intervention, and two cited 
other reasons (for instance, the desire to prevent the expectation that the exchange rate could move in 
only one direction).
10 
In addition to the 10 central banks that conducted secret interventions and three that never intervene, 
seven other central banks, of which five are from Latin America, stated that they did not practise secret 
interventions (although one of them has the authority to do so). Only three central banks out of a total 
of 23 provided no response to this question. 
As noted in Moser-Boehm’s paper in this volume, most central banks believe that secret interventions 
are not against the principle of transparency if followed up by ex post reporting. Several noted that 
secret interventions could be useful as part of tactics - some ambiguity with respect to actions of the 
central bank on a daily basis could help the central bank (see the paper by Archer in this volume). 
                                                       
9  See Sarno and Taylor (2001). The four arguments are: (i) those based on the central bank’s desire to minimise the effects of 
an unwanted intervention - for instance, because the decision to intervene has been taken outside the central bank (eg by 
the treasury); (ii) those based on the central bank’s desire to maximise the impact of intervention by calming a highly volatile 
market (an announcement of intervention might exacerbate the perceived risk of sharp depreciation in such circumstances); 
(iii) portfolio adjustment arguments (eg the monetary authority wishes to adjust the currency holdings of its portfolio without 
affecting the exchange rate); and (iv) arguments based on second-generation currency crisis models - the central bank may 
have an incentive to conceal its intervention operations because it has poor credibility for sending trustworthy signals. 
10   Neely (2001) found similar proportions of central banks intervening secretly to maximise vs minimise market impact, but in 
his sample no central bank cited portfolio adjustment or avoiding one-sided bets as reasons for secret interventions. 90  BIS Papers No 24
 





Effectiveness of secret interventions
1 
Interventions conducted 
secretly (for reasons 







adjustment  Other reasons 
Effective most of the time  5  2  1  0 
Sometimes  effective  3 0 0 1 
Never (or rarely) effective  0  0  0  0 
Total number of responses: 20 out of 23: three central banks do not intervene; 10 confirmed secret interventions; seven do 
not conduct secret interventions (but one of them has the authority to do so); three empty responses. 
1  Number of central banks responding to the question. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
 
2.  Other external effects of intervention 
Reserve accumulation, credit ratings and external vulnerabilities 
Unlike in most industrial countries, many central banks in the emerging market economies consider 
reserve accumulation a legitimate and important goal of official intervention. Following recent currency 
crises - including those in Asia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Turkey - many central banks 
have come to regard high foreign exchange reserves as a key buffer against external vulnerabilities 
and debt sustainability problems. Moreover, many central banks have come to realise that attempts to 
prevent the exchange rate from depreciating when other macroeconomic policies are not tightened 
may in the end increase the probability of a crisis. 
 
Table 7 
External implications of reserve accumulation 
  Major positive 
impact 
Some positive 
impact  No impact 
Effect of reserve accumulation 
on sovereign credit ratings  




South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey 
Colombia 
Effect of reserve accumulation 
on external sustainability  
Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Peru, 




A total of 16 central banks (out of 23) responded (three central banks do not intervene). 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
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Findings on the impact of reserve accumulation on credit ratings and external vulnerability from this 
survey confirm the “buffer” view. Indeed, all 16 central banks that provided the answers reported in 
Table 7 believe that reserve accumulation has at least some positive impact on either sovereign credit 
ratings or external sustainability (or both). The impact on credit ratings is judged to be more moderate 
than the impact on external sustainability, but nevertheless sufficiently important to be taken into 
account. Only in Colombia have credit ratings not improved in the period of reserve accumulation. 
Only one central bank stated explicitly that its intervention had never been guided by the objective of 
accumulating official reserves. In contrast, three central banks noted that building foreign exchange 
reserves was the only reason why they have conducted interventions over the past year or so - the 
impact of such interventions on the exchange rate was virtually nil. 
Several central banks, including some that operate under floating exchange rate regimes, commented 
that higher reserves gave them greater confidence and credibility in foreign exchange markets (“large 
reserves are respected by financial markets”). This helped improve the sustainability of their external 
positions - and hence their credit ratings - through several channels. A higher reserves level implied 
greater capacity to redeem external debt (in particular short-term debt), and reduced the risk of 
speculative attacks on the currency, given that markets regard reserves as a contingent stock for 
intervention purposes. It also reduced international funding costs in a number of emerging economies. 
Several central banks felt that reserve accumulation acted as insurance against the negative effects of 
debt and financial sector crises. In EU accession countries, the higher level of official reserves helped 
mitigate an increase in external vulnerability stemming from liberalisation of capital flows - in particular 
short-term flows. Most central banks have also noted that rating agencies generally view the steady 
trend of reserve accumulation as a result of the underlying strength of the economy. 
Despite a general perception that reserve accumulation can improve credit ratings and reduce external 
vulnerabilities, several central banks noted that macroeconomic fundamentals seem to play the key 
role. In particular, it is very difficult to assess the role of reserve accumulation in this process against 
the background of a better macroeconomic environment as a whole, including solid global growth, 
stronger external positions and the pursuit of sound fiscal and monetary policies by many emerging 
economies in recent years. 
Two central banks were not convinced by the argument that reserve accumulation provided a cushion 
against contingencies or could impress rating agencies. One of them argued that reserves mattered 
for sovereign credit ratings only during the period when countries were passing from the speculative to 
the investment grade rating. Another noted that running down central bank liabilities was a more 
sensible approach than accumulating assets, which inevitably raised questions about the optimal level 
of reserves. 
Intervention and rules affecting foreign exchange transactions 
The insurance motive is also visible in the widespread use of rules affecting foreign exchange 
transactions to supplement official intervention. Some Asian emerging economies often combine 
foreign exchange intervention with capital controls, prudential regulations and other rules such as 
foreign currency surrender requirements (Table 8). Countries that do not use foreign exchange rules in 
conjunction with official intervention nevertheless often use capital controls and prudential regulations 
to monitor or “influence” external exposures, in particular open foreign exchange positions of financial 
institutions. 
Central banks were also asked to assess the impact of foreign exchange rules on the effectiveness of 
intervention. A number of Asian central banks found that capital controls and foreign exchange 
regulations enhanced the effectiveness of intervention. In several countries, the use of temporary or 
new rules during certain episodes of turbulence in foreign exchange markets was judged to improve 
the effectiveness of intervention. 
Central banks provided a number of arguments supporting the use of additional rules on foreign 
exchange transactions. One central bank noted that capital controls were used to increase the 
effectiveness of intervention when the inflows or outflows threatened to be very large. For instance, 
limits on net foreign cash positions of financial institutions, as a percentage of their net worth, were 92  BIS Papers No 24
 
designed by some central banks to limit the capacity of the financial intermediaries to convert 
significant debt or forward positions into spot cash flows, which could have a large and sudden effect 
on the exchange rate.
11 Another central bank observed that, in periods of downward pressure on the 
currency, tightening of prudential regulations tended to dampen the demand for foreign currency. As a 
result, the depreciation pressure on the domestic currency generally eased. Moreover, the size of 
intervention needed to bridge the supply gap became smaller, given that the speculative demand fell. 
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Number of observations: 15 out of 23. Three central banks in the sample did not intervene during 2002-2004 Q3. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
 
Some central banks also felt that the adoption of complementary measures could affect expectations 
by underlining official resolve to bring stability to the foreign exchange market. Such actions also 
signalled to market participants that unwelcome exchange rate movements would not be allowed to 
threaten the fulfilment of key central bank objectives, such as the inflation target. 
Some central banks that officially operate a free or a managed floating system noted that specific 
capital controls helped them make smaller the capital flows that might otherwise have caused a shock 
to thin foreign exchange markets. In particular, some official guidance was deemed helpful in the case 
of flows originating from large public sector firms. In one case, the central bank introduced temporary 
quantitative restrictions on short-term deposits in order to alleviate pressure for currency appreciation. 
As the pressure subsided, the restrictions were lifted. 
However, several central banks were sceptical about the usefulness of foreign exchange regulations in 
enhancing the effectiveness of intervention. In one country, attempts to support interventions in the 
foreign exchange market with capital controls eventually led to the collapse of the float and 
reintroduction of comprehensive administrative controls. Several other central banks argued that 
capital controls and foreign exchange regulations impeded the development of domestic financial 
markets. For instance, the authorities in several countries realised that repatriation of offshore 
                                                       
11   Similar measures were used for instance by France, Portugal and Spain during the ERM crisis in 1992–93; see BIS (1993). BIS Papers No 24  93
 
business could help develop the domestic financial market and decided to lift most restrictions. 
Domestic firms and pension funds became better hedged as a result and investors less confused 
about the authorities’ policy intentions. Particularly helpful was the policy of allowing domestic 
institutional investors access to foreign assets - it helped reduce pressures from capital inflows much 
more effectively than restrictions on inward capital flows. The removal of capital controls in one 
country improved liquidity not just in the foreign exchange market, but also in the government bond 
and equity markets. 
Intervention and dollarisation 
Many developing countries had a long history of macroeconomic instability during the 1970s and 
1980s, which has led to the emergence of widespread dollarisation. While many of them have since 
turned the corner, achieving stable single-digit rates of inflation in recent years, some still have to cope 
with a high level of dollarisation. This creates various complications for monetary policy, including 
official intervention. If there are no major exchange controls, the high degree of substitutability 
between domestic and foreign currency should prevent the market exchange rate from deviating from 
fundamentals, making the signalling channel of intervention much more important. Under these 
circumstances, it has been observed that greater credibility of monetary policy can set in motion a 
virtuous circle that leads to gradual de-dollarisation. 
In Turkey, for instance, rapid disinflation in recent years has had a favourable impact on inflation 
expectations. As the Turkish lira stopped depreciating and started to strengthen against the dollar after 
the 2001 crisis, households and firms have started to sell some of their foreign exchange holdings, 
making it easier for the central bank to purchase the foreign exchange it needs to repay external debt 
and replenish reserves (see Özatay in this volume). Conversely, whenever markets were in a 
vulnerable position due to political instability, dollarisation would resume and there was little the central 
bank could do to stop the process, as a high volume of the assets was beyond its control. 
On the hand, dollarisation can sometimes facilitate intervention by reducing the risk that agents will 
shift out of local currency. This effect was observed on some occasions in Indonesia, Peru and the 
Philippines. As individuals and businesses were already able to keep part of their assets in foreign 
currencies, there was less need in the economy as a whole to buy foreign currencies from the market 
for hedging purposes or for servicing external debt liabilities. 
Some central banks recognised, however, that a marked degree of financial dollarisation heightened 
the risk of balance sheet effects stemming from exchange rate fluctuations, as some agents in the 
economy (including the public sector) are likely to have currency mismatches between their assets 
and liabilities. In such circumstances, official intervention may be an important channel for providing 
liquidity to the economy and minimising the disruptive effect of large depreciations on private balance 
sheets. For instance, during the market turbulence in 2001-02, the Central Bank of Brazil intervened in 
the foreign exchange market by both directly selling foreign currency in the spot market, and providing 
foreign currency indexed instruments in the futures markets. Such interventions proved effective. 
However, they were temporary and were part of a broader strategy that involved other policies, whose 
objective was not to target the exchange rate level but to provide liquidity to the economy. 
Conclusion 
Does the central bank survey presented in this paper support the widespread view that intervention is 
more effective in emerging market economies? Unfortunately, no definitive answer can be given.  
The survey does show that many central banks in emerging markets view intervention as an effective 
tool within their monetary policy framework. However, to be effective intervention needs to be aligned 
with macroeconomic and financial market conditions, central banks believe. If the exchange rate is 
depreciating because of weak fundamentals, intervention will not help stabilise it for very long. 
Currency appreciation is perhaps easier to resist, but even in this case some central banks point to 
limits to intervention where markets are aware of the costs of intervention for central banks. In general, 
it seems that intervention cannot affect the exchange rate on its own; the main burden in stabilising 
the exchange rate is primarily on monetary policy and often on fiscal policy as well. 94  BIS Papers No 24
 
Central banks report that intervention used to accumulate official reserves can be effective in 
improving sovereign credit ratings and reducing external vulnerabilities. However, the positive effect 
on credit ratings seems to work only for countries that do not already have an investment grade rating. 
Views on the usefulness of various restrictions on foreign exchange transactions to supplement official 
intervention are mixed. Those central banks that had removed capital controls feel that this move had 
spurred the development of domestic foreign exchange and capital markets. Markets have become 
more liquid and domestic agents better hedged against foreign currency risks. But many central banks 
that have kept some foreign exchange and capital controls feel that these controls are useful, in 
particular when the foreign exchange market is under stress. Most feel that such controls have to be 




Table A1 Foreign exchange turnover
1  
 
Reported by dealers in the 
country of issue 
Total
2 Official  reserves 
/ daily turnover 
  1998 2001  2004 2001 2004  2001  2004 
Latin America             
Argentine peso  2,131  n.a.  684 n.a. 684  n.a.  20.7 
Brazilian real  3,418  4,612  3,127 5,239 4,344 6.6  11.5 
Chilean peso  1,212  2,282  2,314 2,282 2,314  6.3  6.7 
Colombian peso  n.a  371  669  371  669  24.5  16.0 
Mexican peso  6,961  5,888  10,059 10,086 20,312  4.0  2.9 
Peruvian sol  n.a  203  251  203  251  40.5  40.1 
Asia             
Hong Kong dollar  14,833  19,016 19,967  27,381  33,181 4.2 3.7 
Indian rupee  1,337  2,762  5,313 2,840 6,066 14.0 18.6 
Korean won  2,288  7,916  15,815 9,757  21,151  9.5  7.7 
Taiwan dollar  1,658  2,609  3,869 3,167 7,261 35.3 31.4 
Indonesian rupiah  850  535  1,419 552  2,051  50.4  17.3 
Malaysian ringgit  579  923  987  923  987  27.3  52.8 
Philippine peso  408  455  523  502  765  24.6  17.3 
Singapore dollar  16,819  9,841  8,751 12,886 17,010 5.9 5.8 
Thai baht  2,123  1,274  2,088 1,859 3,492  16.9  11.9 
Central and eastern Europe         
Czech koruna  4,169  1,135  965 2,234 2,813  5.9  9.3 
Hungarian forint  528  173 1,380  197  3,625 55.7  3.2 
Polish zloty  910  3,376  3,400 6,325 7,031  4.4  5.1 
Russian rouble  4,519  4,158  10,631 4,282  12,208 6.5 6.5 
Other emerging markets         
Israeli shekel  n.a  506 1,969  506  1,969 46.3 13.5 
Turkish lira  n.a  231  1,439 433  1,991  41.8  17.0 
Saudi Arabian riyal  1,235  840  689  840  689  17.7  26.1 
South African rand  6,087  6,846  5,682 11,327 13,656 0.5 0.6 
Total above currencies  72,065 75,952  101,991 104,192 164,520  21.6
3 14.6
3 
Memorandum           
Australian dollar  19,638  20,076 27,046  49,653  97,123 0.3 0.3 
Swedish krona  4,847  11,466  13,811 30,146 40,639  0.4  0.4 
Swiss franc  21,748  17,767  21,143 71,053  107,705  0.4  0.4 
Total (all currencies)  1,429,284 634,650 943,542  1,173,066 1,773,275    …  … 
n.a.= not available 
1  Daily averages during April, in millions of dollars. Figures are the sum of spot, forwards and foreign exchange 
swaps in local and cross-border transactions, adjusted for local and cross-border double counting.    
2  Reported by dealers both inside and outside of country of issue.     
3  Simple average.  
Source: BIS, Triennial central bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives market activity in 2004. 96  BIS Papers No 24
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